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JOINT AND MUTUAL WILLS IN NEBRASKA AND THE
MARITAL DEDUCTION
I. INTRODUCTION
Many couples who have toiled all their lives for their worldly
goods often wish to make a common disposition of their property.
The usual situation is for a couple to leave the entire estate of the
first to die to the surviving spouse either absolutely or in the
form of a life estate on condition that the last to die leave it to
designated third persons. This type of common disposition is often
effectuated by the use of a joint,' mutual,2 or reciprocal will.3  A
recent state supreme court decision 4 has changed Nebraska's posi-
tion concerning the contractual aspect of such wills and the pur-
pose of this article is: (1) to comment on Nebraska's present
position regarding these wills in light of this case and (2) to
discuss the problem of qualifying the interest that passes to the
surviving spouse under the above mentioned wills for the marital
deduction for federal estate tax purposes.
1 "A 'joint' will is best defined as a single testamentary instrument
which contains the wills of two or more persons, is executed jointly
by them, and disposes of property owned jointly, in common, or in
severalty by them .... Clearly, a will, although joint in the sense
that it incorporates in one instrument the testamentary dispositions of
two or more testators, is in effect the separate will of each." Annot.,
169 A.L.R. 9, 12 (1947) (footnotes omitted). However an instrument
executed by two testators, where one is the owner of all the property,
is not a joint will. The signature of the other testator is treated as
surplusage. In re Hansen's Estate, 87 Neb. 567, 127 N.W. 879 (1910).
2" 'Mutual' wills have been defined as wills executed pursuant to an
agreement between two or more persons to dispose of their property
in a particular manner, each in consideration of the other. In other
jurisdictions, wills are deemed 'mutual' where executed with a com-
mon intention on the part of the testators, irrespective of whether
there is a contract between them. 'Mutual' wills have been defined
as documents of a testamentary character, executed in pursuance of
an agreement or arrangement between two or more persons to dispose
of their property either to each other or to third persons in a particular
mode or manner. So defined, a contract against revocation may or
may not be present. It is, however, the contractual element which is
involved in most litigation concerning either joint or mutual wills.
'Mutual' wills have also been called 'twin' wills." Annot., 169 A.L.R.
9, 13 (1947) (footnotes omitted).
3 "'Reciprocal' wills are those in which the testators name each other as
beneficiaries under similar testamentary plans. They are sometimes
called 'double' or 'counter' wills .... Wills may be strictly reciprocal,
each testator leaving his or her entire estate to the survivor, or they
may depart from strict reciprocity by including bequests to third per-
sons, without losing their character as 'reciprocal' wills." Id. at 13.
4 Kimmel v. Roberts, 179 Neb. 8, 136 N.W.2d 208 (1965).
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II. PROVING THE ORAL CONTRACT AND THE
STATUTE OF FRAUDS
In the case of Kimmel v. Roberts 5 the husband and wife exe-
cuted separate reciprocal wills which were identical in content ex-
cept for the change in the names of the parties and the use of the
words husband and wife therein. The wills provided that upon
the death of the first spouse his or her entire estate would go to
the other, and further that upon the death of the survivor the
estate would then go to the nieces and nephews of both, share and
share alike. The husband died first and his will was probated
leaving his entire estate to his wife. Subsequently the wife revoked
her reciprocal will by executing a new one which altered the dis-
position of her previous will to the benefit of her nieces and neph-
ews and to the detriment of the nieces and nephews of her de-
ceased husband. Upon the death of the wife this action was brought
by the nieces and nephews of the deceased husband maintaining
that the reciprocal wills executed by the husband and wife were
pursuant to a binding oral contract which became irrevocable upon
the death of the husband. The nieces and nephews of the deceased
wife defended on the ground that a valid enforcible contract had
not been established and that the second will of the wife should
control the disposition of the property. The trial court found the
evidence insufficient to sustain an enforcible contract and on ap-
peal held: that, "[a] lthough there is evidence of an oral agreement,
the effect of which is to make the reciprocal wills irrevocable,
there is no proof of part performance sufficient to remove the
bar of the statute of frauds."
6
This is the usual joint, mutual, or reciprocal will case in that
the separate reciprocal wills mentioned above indicate that they
were drawn pursuant to some type of arrangement or common
understanding between the husband and wife. It is reasoned that
certainly the deceased husband would not have executed his will in
this manner if he knew that after his death his wife would execute
a subsequent will in violation of the arrangement, and therefore
the husband must have executed his will pursuant to a binding
contract. The bargained for consideration being the mutual prom-
ises of the husband and wife to leave their property to each other.
However, the problem is that the wills do not state that the
arrangement was intended as a binding contract, nor is the alleged
agreement set out in a separate document as it ought to be. There-
fore the alleged contract must first be shown to exist, and then it
5 Id.
6 Kimmel v. Roberts, 179 Neb. 8, 12, 136 N.W.2d 208, 211 (1965).
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must be taken out of the Statute of Frauds as an interest in land
will pass to the beneficiaries under the terms of the will.7 In a suit
to enforce the specific performance of an oral contract embraced
within the Statute of Frauds, two distinct facts must be established:
(1) the terms of the alleged parol contract and (2) the acts of
part performance which removes the bar of the Statute of Frauds.8
The court in the Kimmel case cited the rule as it was stated
in the case of Overlander v. Ware9 as follows:
In considering cases of this character, where one is claiming the
estate of a person deceased under an alleged oral contract, the
evidence of such contract and the terms of it must be clear, sat-
isfactory, and unequivocal. Such contracts are on their face void as
within the statute of frauds, because not in writing, and, even
though proven by clear and satisfactory evidence, they are not
enforceable unless there has been such performance as the law re-
quires. The thing done, constituting performance, must be such as
is referrable solely to th4 contract sought to be enforced, and not
such as might be referrable to some other and different contract
-something that the claimant would not have done unless on ac-
count of the agreement and with the direct view to its performance
-so that nonperformance by the other party would amount to
fraud upon him.' 0
The rule then as regards part performance is that the thing
done, constituting performance, must be such as is referable solely
to the contract sought to be enforced, and in order to meet this
test the court has stated that the act of part performance must be
accounted for only by the existence of the pleaded oral agree-
ment." The act of part performance in the Kimmel case is the
husband devising his property to his wife and subsequently dying.
Since devising the property to the wife is the usual thing done, the
fact that he did so cannot be accountable solely to the contract
sought to be enforced, and therefore does not meet the test of part
performance. This is the line of reasoning in the Kimmel case
7 NEB. REV. STAT. § 36-103 (Reissue 1960) states: "No estate or interest
in land, other than leases for a term of one year from the making
thereof, nor any trust or power over or concerning lands, or in any
manner relating thereto, shall hereafter be created, granted, assigned,
surrendered, or declared, unless by operation of law, or by deed of
conveyance in writing, subscribed by the party creating, granting, as-
signing, surrendering or declaring the same."
8 NEB. REV. STAT. § 36-106 (Reissue 1960) states: "Nothing contained in
sections 36-101 to 36-106 shall be construed to abridge the powers of
a court of equity to compel the specific performance of agreements in
cases of part performance."
9 102 Neb. 216, 166 N.W. 611 (1918).
10 Id. at 217-18, 166 N.W. at 611-12.
11 Eagan v. Hall, 159 Neb. 537, 68 N.W.2d 147 (1955).
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as it states that "the giving of a husband's property to his wife by
will is a matter of common occurrence in the relationship of hus-
band and wife and it cannot be said that it refers to, results from,
or is in pursuance of the oral contract here sought to be en-
forced.' 2
Since both part performance and proof of the contract are
needed in order to make the agreement enforceable, disproving
one makes it unnecessary to consider the other, and therefore the
court reaches this decision without considering the sufficiency of
the evidence to establish the oral contract. In the writer's opinion
the court has reached the right conclusion in the case, but for the
wrong reasons.
The real issue in the case is whether or not the wills were
executed pursuant to a binding contract, and if this can be proven
by clear, satisfactory, and unequivocal evidence, there is no reason
not to enforce the contract after the first spouse dies. By deciding
the Kimmel case as it did, the court unnecessarily restricts the
doctrine of part performance as regards joint, mutual, and recipro-
cal wills. If, in the future, an analogous case comes before the
court, and a contract is proven beyond the shadow of a doubt, the
court will be unable to enforce the contract due to the fact that a
husband devising his property to his wife can always be explained
by the fact that it is the usual thing done and the test of part per-
formance will not be met. The court overlooks the fact that it is
just not the usual thing for a husband to will one half of his
estate to the nieces and nephews of his wife.
It is important to keep in mind that either spouse may revoke
the contract during the life of both if notice is given to the
other.'8 The rationale for this is the ambulatory nature of a will,
that a person until the time of his death should be able to dispose
of his property as he wishes. "This policy should not be defeated
by an inter vivos contract, when the only consideration is a prom-
ise, and value has not yet been transferred."' 4 However, upon the
death of the first spouse to die, the contract (not the will) be-
comes irrevocable and becomes enforcible in a court of equity.15
12 Kimmel v. Roberts, 179 Neb. 8, 11, 136 N.W.2d 208, 210 (1965).
's The language for this proposition is dicta; however, this is the position
taken by almost all treatises on this subject. Jennings v. McKeen, 245
Iowa 1206, 65 N.W.2d 207, (1954) (dictum); Child v. Smith, 225 Iowa
1205, 1214, 282 N.W. 317, 321 (1938) (dictum); J. ScHOULER, WiLLs,
EXECUTORS AND ADnlmSTRATORs § 270 (6th ed. 1923); G. THO~MsON,
WLLs § 34 (2d ed. 1936).
14 This explanation is offered in 61 HARv. L. REv. 675, 682 (1948).
I See B. SPARKS, CONTRACTS TO MAKE WnLLS 50-161 (1956).
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Therefore, the husband has fully performed his part of the bargain;
he has willed his property to his wife, and it is now up to the wife
to perform her part by leaving the entire estate to the nieces and
nephews of both, share and share alike.
In reaching its conclusion in the Kimmel case, the court over-
ruled two earlier cases Brown v. Webster 6 and Mack v. Swanson.'7
They stood for the proposition that joint, mutual, or reciprocal
wills themselves tended to prove the existence of the oral contract
and the Statute of Frauds was no bar. With the overruling of these
two cases, Nebraska is now in line with the majority of jurisdic-
tions holding that the mere presence of joint, mutual, or reciprocal
wills does not raise any presumption that they were executed in
pursuance of a binding contract.'3
However, the rationale of the rule followed by the majority of
jurisdictions is that the presence of the wills is merely evidentiary
material to consider in attempting to establish the contract in the
first place, and Nebraska's position is that the presence of the
wills does not constitute part performance to bring the contract
out of the Statute of Frauds, regardless of whether or not there is
a contract. Under the majority rule, if an oral contract is estab-
lished by the necessary evidence, the contract can be enforced (the
part performance being the executions of the wills to bring the
contract out of the Statute of Frauds) while under the Nebraska
rationale, even if a contract is established beyond a shadow of a
doubt it will be unenforceable due to the fact that the execution
of the wills does not satisfy Nebraska's rule of part performance.
The real issue in the case is whether or not there was in fact
an oral contract, and by deciding the Kimmel case as it did, the
court unnecessarily restricts the equitable doctrine of part per-
formance. Fraud can be more easily avoided by the strict re-
quirement of clear, satisfactory, and unequivocal evidence which
is required to prove the contract, 19 rather than by the strict inter-
16 90 Neb. 591, 134 N.W. 185 (1912).
17 Mack v. Swanson, 140 Neb. 295, 299 N.W. 543 (1941).
18 See Rolls v. Allen, 204 Cal. 604, 269 P. 450 (1928) (held that the execu-
tion of joint reciprocal wills had no tendency to show a contractual
obligation); Jacoby v. Jacoby, 342 Ill. App. 277, 96 N.E.2d 362 (1950);
In re Gudewicz' Will, 72 N.Y.S.2d 838 (Sur. Ct. 1947). Wills drawn in
identical language and containing reciprocal provisions indicate a com-
mon understanding but do not show a contract. Lynch v. Lichtenthaler,
85 Cal. App.2d 437, 193 P.2d 77 (1948); Paull v. Earlywine, 195 Okla.
486, 159 P.2d 556 (1945); Johansen v. Davenport Bank & Trust Co., 242
Iowa 172, 46 N.W.2d 48 (1951).
19 The amount of proof necessary to prove the contract in other states has
been expressed in a variety of ways and is supported by enumerable
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pretation of the doctrine of part performance. 20
IHI. THE MARITAL DEDUCTION
The marital deduction is a provision in the Internal Revenue
Code which exempts up to one-half of the adjusted gross estate
from federal estate tax on any interest in property passing from a
decedent to his wife.21 The interest passing to the wife must be
in the nature of a fee simple absolute, that is to say it must not fail
by reason of a lapse of time or the occurrence or non-occurrence of
an event or contingency.22 A common example of this is where the
decedent wills a life estate to his wife, remainder to their chil-
dren. The wife's interest will lapse on her death, and therefore
does not qualify for the marital deduction. However, if the wife in
the above example is given a life estate with a general power of
appointment, it would qualify for the marital deduction as the code
specifically exempts this particular type of interest.23 The wife
must have the power to appoint the entire interest to herself, to
her estate, or to either, whether exercisable during her life or by
will only.
cases only a few of which will be cited here. E.g., Moumal v. Walsh,
9 Alas. 656, 662 (1940) ("clear, satisfactory and convincing"); Rolls v.
Allen, 204 Cal. 604, 608, 269 P. 450, 452 (1928) ("most indisputable");
Soho v. Wimbrough, 145 Md. 498, 510, 125 A. 767, 771 (1924) ("definite
and certain, strong and convincing"); Opel v. Aurien, 352 Mo. 592, 600,
179 S.W.2d 1, 4 (1944) ("a very high degree of proof"); Cox v. Wil-
liamson, 124 Mont. 512, 525, 227 P.2d 614, 621 (1951) ("clear, cogent and
convincing"); Stafford v. Reed, 363 Pa. 405, 410, 70 A.2d 345, 348 (1950)("clear, precise and indubitable"). A few courts apparently require
that a contract to make a will be proved beyond reasonable doubt, thus
applying a standard similar to the one required for proof of guilt in
criminal cases. See Matthews v. Blanos, 201 Ga. 549, 563, 40 S.E.2d 715,
726 (1946); Salmon v. McCrary, 197 Ga. 281, 285, 29 S.E.2d 58, 60 (1944);
Brickley v. Leonard, 129 Me. 94, 97, 149 A. 833, 835 (1930); Bicknell v.
Guenther, 65 Wash.2d 749, 399 P.2d 598 (1965).
20 An interesting earlier case to be noted in this connection is Riley v.
Riley, 150 Neb. 176, 33 N.W.2d 525 (1948). In discussing the rule of
part performance (that the thing constituting part performance must
be referable solely to the contract sought to be enforced and not to
some other or different contract) the court stated that: "The fact that
there may be adversary evidence indicating that the acts refer to some
other contract or situation will not defeat the satisfaction of the rule.
Where one seeking specific performance of an oral contract to convey
real estate has satisfied by evidence the requirements of this rule and
there is evidence of an adversary in conflict therewith the decision on
this question becomes one of the preponderance with the preponderant
burden on the one seeking performance." Id. at 183, 33 N.W.2d at 529.
21 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2056.
22 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2056(b) (1).
23 INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 2056(b) (5)."
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If a testator wants to leave his or her estate to the survivor on
stipulation that the survivor leaves it to certain designated third
persons, the testator by employing a joint and mutual will can do
it in one of four ways. In the following examples it will be as-
sumed that the husband will be the first to die, and it is his
intention that the entire estate of his surviving wife to be left to
their children, share and share alike.
He can leave his estate to his wife for life with remainders
over to the children. In this way the husband can be absolutely
sure that the children will get the estate eventually, however, the
interest passing to the wife is a terminable one and does not qual-
ify for the marital deduction. 24
A second method the husband could follow would be to leave
his estate to his wife in the form of a life estate with a general
power of appointment. The interest passing to the wife would
qualify for the marital deduction.2 5 However, in this case, the wife
could appoint to herself, and the husband is thus unable to control
the ultimate disposition of the estate.
A third way would be the Kimmel case, to leave the entire
estate to the wife, and on the death of the wife the entire estate
will go to the designated third persons. The problem here is that
the joint and mutual will passes an absolute fee simple to the wife,
and she is free to revoke her will at any time, and thereby alter
the disposition of the estate. As the interest passing to the wife is
an absolute one, it qualifies for the marital deduction, but again
the husband is unable to dictate the ultimate disposition of the
estate.
The fourth way would be to execute a joint and mutual will
as in the third example, and execute it pursuant to a binding con-
tract as stated either in the wills themselves, or in a separate docu-
ment. The consideration for the contract would be the mutual
promises of husband and wife, each promise being the consideration
for the other. After the husband dies, the wife has a contractual
obligation to leave the entire estate to the children. If she breaches
the contract either by making a new will thereby altering the dis-
position of the estate, or by making wrongful inter vivos transfers,
the children will have an appropriate contract remedy.2-6 In this
way the husband can be sure that the children will eventually get
the entire property, however the question of whether or not the
24 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2056(b) (1).
25 INT. REv. CODE of 1954, § 2056(b) (5).
26 See, B. SPARKS, CONTRACTS TO MAE WILLS, 50-161 (1956).
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interest passing to the wife qualifies for the marital deduction is
a difficult problem.
A. HUSBAND AND WIFE HOLDING THE PROPERTY As JOINT TEANTs
If the husband and wife execute reciprocal wills pursuant to a
binding contract that the survivor is to leave it to third parties, and
their property is held as joint tenants or tenants by the entirety,
the interest passing to the survivor under the will is an absolute
one thereby qualifying for the marital deduction.27 The theory
being that upon the death of the first to die, ownership inures to
the survivor since they held as joint tenants, and therefore the sur-
vivor is absolute owner. Even though the survivor entered into a
binding contract to leave the entire property to third persons prior
to her receiving the property, still the title transferring process
was the contract of joint tenancy and under its terms she becomes
absolute owner in fee simple. It is the title transferring process
that is important, and not the fact that the survivor entered into a
binding contract to leave it to third parties even before receiving
the full title.
Estate of Peterson v. Commissioner28 was a Nebraska case
which involved a husband and wife executing a joint and mutual
will in which the estate of the first to die was left to the other and
the survivor's estate was left to the children. The will stated in
effect that the first to die gave their estate to the survivor ab-
solutely and forever and "expressly subject to the privilege and
right of the survivor to use all or any portion of said estate for his
or her use and benefit in the event the survivor in his or her sole
discretion may elect so to do."
'29
The court held that the widow held all property as life tenant
under Nebraska law with the right to use it only for her support,
comfort, and enjoyment,30 or that the contractual terms of the
27 United States v. Spicer, 332 F.2d 750 (10th Cir. 1964); Estate of Awtry
v. Commissioner, 221 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1955); Schildmeier v. United
States, 171 F. Supp. 328 (S.D. Ind. 1959); McLean v. United States, 224
F. Supp. 726 (E.D. Mich. 1963), affd 65-2 U.S. Tax Cas. [ 12,326 (6th
Cir. 1965).
28 23 T.C. 1020 (1955).
29 Id. at 1021.
30 Annable v. Ricedorf, 140 Neb. 93, 299 N.W. 373 (1941). In this case
testator devised to his wife as follows: 1I give, devise and bequeath
to my beloved wife Elizabeth Ricedorf, all my estate, real, personal
and mixed wherever located, to her own use and benefit forever; and
it is my desire and wish that after her death, that all the property
remaining, shall be divided equally between my son Burr and my
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joint and mutual will became irrevocable upon the death of the
husband3 ' and the children acquired a contract interest in the
property which was enforcible in a court of equity.32  Either
way the interest passing to the wife would be a terminable one not
qualifying for the marital deduction.
On the taxpayer's appeal to the court of appeals the decision
was reversed pursuant to stipulation on the authority of that cir-
cuit's decision in Awtry v. Commissioner.33 Since the husband and
wife held most of their property as joint tenants, the surviving
spouse did not obtain any interest in the property by virtue of the
will, but acquired absolute title through the terms of the joint
tenancy and therefore the interest passing to the wife qualified
for the marital deduction.
Of course the Brown and Mack cases have now been overruled
by the Kimmel case, and therefore, the existence of a joint and
mutual will is not of itself conclusive evidence of a contract in
Nebraska. Therefore if the Peterson case were decided today, the
surviving spouse would not be contractually bound to leave the
property to the children. However, it should be noted that under
the court's interpretation of Nebraska law the surviving spouse re-
ceived only a life estate with right to use it only for her support,
comfort, and enjoyment. The will gave it to her absolutely and
forever with the right of the survivor to use all or any portion of
the estate for her benefit in her sole discretion, yet the tax court
interpreted this as giving her only a life estate under Nebraska
law.34 The testator in Nebraska should be extremely careful in his
daughter Belle." The court held that the widow was entitled to a life
estate only with power to dispose of and use the principal thereof only
so far as the same might reasonably be necessary for support, comfort,
and enjoyment. Id. at 94, 95, 299 N.W. at 375.
31 Brown v. Webster, 90 Neb. 591, 134 N.W. 185 (1912).
32 Mack v. Swanson, 140 Neb. 295, 299 N.W. 543 (1941).
33 221 F.2d 749 (8th Cir. 1955). In this case husband and wife executed
a joint and mutual will leaving their property to each other, remainder
to go to their nieces and nephews. The tax court held that since the
wife was under a contractual obligation to leave the property to third
persons, it was a terminable interest. However the eighth circuit re-
versed stating that the property interest was an absolute one as it
passed under the terms of the joint tenancy, and the fact that she
entered into a contract to leave the property to third persons made no
difference.
34 23 T.C. 1020 (1955). The court, Id. at 1024, cited NEBa. REv. STAT. §
76-205 (Reissue 1958) which reads as follows: "In the construction of
every instrument creating or conveying, or authorizing or requiring the
creation or conveyance of any real estate, or interest therein, it shall
be the duty of the courts of justice to carry into effect the true intent
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selection of words for he may intend to give his spouse a life estate
with a general power of appointment so as to qualify for the marital
deduction, however it may be that he has only given a life estate
with a power of consumption which does not qualify for the de-
duction.
B. HUSBAND AD WIFE HOLDING PROPERTY SEVERALLY
Estate of Vermiiya v. Commissioner35 was a tax court decision
in which the husband and wife executed a joint and mutual will
in which they devised their respective property to the survivor in
fee simple absolute. The will also contained certain specific and
general legacies that were to take effect after the death of both the
husband and his wife. The specific legacies were certain real estate,
stocks, and bonds which were to go to named individuals. The gen-
eral legacies were to go to named individuals in specific proportions,
the fund being the sale of all assets remaining in the estate after
expenses and debts were paid. The only jointly held property
amounted to 7,304.88 dollars, while the adjusted gross estate
amounted to 87,013.38 dollars. The Commissioner disallowed the
marital deduction for all property passing to the spouse except
for the jointly held property, on the theory that either: (1) the
will only granted a life estate under Minnesota law, or else (2) the
interest was a terminable one as the survivor was subject to a con-
tractual obligation to devise the property to third persons at his
or her death.
The tax court held that under Minnesota law the survivor took
a fee simple absolute, and it pointed out that there was a split of
authority on the question of whether the existence of a joint and
mutual will was conclusive proof that it was executed pursuant to a
contract. Under Minnesota law the question was unsettled so the
tax court assumed it was pursuant to a contract, and therefore the
surviving wife was under a contractual obligation to leave the prop-
erty as the will so stated. The court then held that the marital
deduction was allowable with respect to the general legacies, but
did not decide the question whether it was allowable as to the
of the parties, so far as such intent can be collected from the whole
instrument, and so far as such intent is consistent with the rules of
law." The court concluded that the couple intended to provide for the
ultimate disposition of the estate and cited the Annable case. Other
Nebraska cases on the construction of life estates are as follows:
Abbott v. Wagner, 108 Neb. 359, 188 N.W. 113 (1922); In 'e Estate of
Darr, 114 Neb. 116, 206 N.W. 2 (1925); Perigo v. Perigo, 158 Neb. 733,
64 N.W.2d 789 (1954); Trute v. Skeede, 162 Neb. 266, 75 N.W.2d 672
(1956).
35 41 T.C. 226 (1963).
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specific legacies since the value of the property, not specifically
mentioned in the will, exceeded the maximum marital deduction.
There is a provision in the regulations of the Internal Revenue
Code which states as follows: "The deduction may not be taken
with respect to a property interest which passed to such spouse
merely as trustee, or subject to a binding agreement by the spouse
to dispose of the interest in favor of a third person."30
The tax court held that this provision applied to a contract to
devise specific property, because only with specifically mentioned
property could one say that the beneficiary had received an inter-
est in property at the time the contract was made. As to general
property, the court stated that it would not be disqualified for the
deduction as a terminable interest, "merely because it would, if
held until death of the second spouse, be subject to a contract to
leave all property owned at death in a certain manner. 3
7
IV. CONCLUSION
The Nebraska Supreme Court is unnecessarily strict in its in-
terpretation of the doctrine of part performance. The Kimmel case
should have been decided strictly on the issue of whether or not the
contract could be proven by clear, satisfactory, and unequivocal
evidence. If the contract is then proven by the required evidence,
there is no reason not to enforce it on the theory that the husband
has partly performed the contract by willing the property to his
wife, and dying leaving the will unchanged. Nevertheless it is
quite clear that if a joint, mutual, or reciprocal will is used in
Nebraska it should definitely state whether or not it is executed
pursuant to a binding contract.
If the will is so executed, and the property is held severally
by husband and wife, it is not clear whether or not property spe-
cifically devised would qualify for the marital deduction. Further,
it is difficult to understand why a testator would wish to bind the
survivor as regards the ultimate disposition of the estate by the
use of such wills, as this makes it difficult for the surviving spouse
to cope with unforeseen economic difficulties. If the wife is inex-
perienced in financial affairs, perhaps the husband would like to
insure that she receive a life income, however the use of a joint and
mutual will to effectuate this is taking a chance, as the wife may
die first and the husband would then be bound to the terms of
the will.
86 Treas. Reg. § 20.2056(e)-2(a).
37 Estate of Vermilya v. Commissioner, 41 T.C. 226, 232 (1963).
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The confusion attending such wills, and the relatively small
amount of authority on the question of the marital deduction, should
classify the use of such wills as questionable devices for the care-
ful estate planner. If they are to be used at all, they should be
used for estates smaller than 60,000 dollars38 so as to avoid any
marital deduction problems, and for larger estates a trust with a
pour over provision from a will would be a more flexible and less
confusing means of disposition.
Gary D. Blair '68
38 The amount of the exemption to be deducted from the value of the
gross estate in determining the estate tax. INT. REV. CODE of 1954,
§ 2052.
